Modigliani–Miller propositions
In a perfect market with no taxes, borrowing does not add value: firm value depends on cash flows, and the cost of equity rises exactly enough to cancel cheaper debt (Propositions I and II). With corporate taxes, the debt tax shield adds tD to value and lowers the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Add costs of financial distress and an optimal level of debt appears.
Before this: Weighted-average cost of capital (WACC), Investors and Other Stakeholders
On the exam
- Explain the Modigliani–Miller propositions regarding capital structure
Explain the Modigliani–Miller propositions. Expect a cost-of-equity calculation with and without taxes, V_L = V_U + tD, and questions that ask which proposition or which assumption set a statement belongs to.
How deeply to learn each part
- Know the idea
- Understand it in general. It frames other topics, but you will not calculate with it.
- Use it
- Understand it well enough to solve a question with it. Recognize when it applies.
- Memorize
- Learn it by heart. The exam will not give it to you.
You know this one. The full lesson is folded away. The takeaways, formulas and checkpoint below are your quick refresher, and the checkpoint is a fair test of whether you still do.
You tested strong here. The full lesson is folded away. The takeaways, formulas and checkpoint below are your quick refresher, and the checkpoint is a fair test of whether you still know it.
What did Modigliani and Miller assume?
In 1958 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller asked a clean question: if you hold a company’s investments fixed, does changing how it is financed change its value? They answered it under a set of idealized assumptions, then relaxed them one at a time. The result is the standard starting point for thinking about debt.
- Homogeneous expectations. Investors agree on a given investment’s expected cash flows.
- Perfect capital markets . No taxes, transaction costs or bankruptcy costs, and everyone has the same information.
- Risk-free borrowing and lending. Investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate.
- No agency costs. Managers always act to maximize shareholder wealth.
- Independent decisions. Financing and investment decisions do not affect each other.
Real markets violate every one of these, which is exactly why the framework is useful: each violation can be switched on to see what it does.
- No taxes Memorize perfect markets
- Proposition I V_L = V_U
- Proposition II r_e rises linearly; WACC constant
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- Corporate taxes Memorize interest is deductible
- Proposition I V_L = V_U + tD
- Proposition II r_e rises more slowly; WACC falls
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- Taxes plus distress costs Use it an optimal level of debt appears
- Direct costs legal and administrative
- Indirect costs lost customers, staff and chances
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Without taxes: why does financing not matter?
Modigliani–Miller Proposition I without taxes says that the value of a levered company equals the value of an unlevered one.
Value is the present value of expected future cash flows. Changing the mix of debt and equity slices the same cash flows differently but does not change their total, so a company’s value is set by its cash flows, not by its financing. The argument rests on homemade leverage : an investor who wants more (or less) leverage than the company has can borrow (or lend) personally, at the risk-free rate, and reach the same position. Because investors can undo or create the company’s leverage themselves, they will not pay extra for it. If two firms with the same cash flows traded at different values, arbitrage would close the gap.
Go deeper Homemade leverage, step by step
Take an unlevered firm (Firm A) worth 1,000, and an otherwise identical firm (Firm B) that has debt of 500. Both generate the same operating cash flows, X. An investor wants a 10% stake in B’s leveraged equity. Instead she buys 10% of A’s shares for 100 and borrows 50 at the risk-free rate (the same rate B pays, by assumption).
Her payoff is 10% of X minus the interest on 50. A 10% stake in B’s equity pays 10% of X minus 10% of the interest on 500, which is the same thing. Her net outlay is 100 − 50 = 50, so a 10% stake in B’s equity should cost 50, which means B’s equity is worth 500 and B is worth 1,000, exactly like A. If B’s equity were worth more, she could sell it, replicate its payoffs more cheaply, and pocket a riskless profit. Trades like that push the two values together.
MM do not assume bankruptcy away. They assume it carries no cost.
Higher leverage does make equity riskier, though, which brings in the second proposition.
Modigliani–Miller Proposition II without taxes says the cost of equity rises linearly with the debt-to-equity ratio.
Here is the cost of capital of an all-equity firm, the cost of debt, and and the market values of debt and equity. The intercept is and the slope is . Debt looks cheaper, but every extra dollar of it makes shareholders’ returns riskier, and they demand more. The rise in exactly cancels the saving from cheaper debt, so WACC stays at .
A company's unlevered cost of capital is 9.00%, its cost of debt is 5.00%, its tax rate is 0.00% and its debt-to-equity ratio is 0.5. Under the Modigliani–Miller propositions, its cost of equity is closest to:
9.00% + (9.00% − 5.00%) × 1 × 0.5 = 11.00%
Cost of equity, r_e11.00%
- 9−5×0.5+9=11, in percent
- 9ENTER5−0.5×9+11, in percent
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
With corporate taxes: why does debt add value?
Interest is deductible, so a profitable company that borrows pays less tax. The saving is the debt tax shield . If the debt is permanent, the present value of the shield is the tax rate times the debt, .
The only reason value rises is the tax shield, and the higher the tax rate, the greater the benefit of debt. Because value rises with debt, WACC must fall with debt: debt is now cheaper still (after tax), and the higher cost of equity no longer cancels the saving. The cost of equity still rises with D/E, but more slowly, because of the term.
Set and you get back the no-tax formula. Taken literally, the with-tax model says a company should borrow almost without limit, with 100% debt optimal. That conclusion is at odds with reality, and it comes from leaving out costs of financial distress (next section).
An unlevered company is worth 600.00. It issues 200.00 of permanent debt and the tax rate is 25.00%. Under MM with taxes (and no distress costs), the levered company's value is closest to:
600.00 + 0.25 × 200.00 = 650.00
Levered value, V_L650.00
- 0.25×200+600=650
- 0.25ENTER200×600+650
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Try this 0 of 3
- With no taxes, push D/E all the way to 2 and watch WACC
- Turn taxes on and compare the slope of r_e
- Firm value: with taxes on, value the worked example (V_U 600, debt 200)
- Cost of equity, r_e
- WACC
- Cost of debt, r_d
No taxes: r_e rises 4 points per unit of D/E (r_0 − r_d), exactly enough to offset the cheaper debt, so WACC stays at r_0 = 9.00% and firm value does not change.
Show working
r_e = r_0 + (r_0 − r_d)(D/E) = 9.00% + (9.00% − 5.00%) × 0.5 = 11.0000%
D/V = 0.5 ÷ (1 + 0.5) = 0.333333; E/V = 0.666667
WACC = 0.333333 × 5.00% + 0.666667 × 11.0000% = 9.0000% = r_0
- 9−5×0.5+9=r_e = 11%
- 9ENTER5−0.5×9+r_e = 11%
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Display: 11
Why not borrow 100%? Costs of financial distress
Financial distress is the heightened uncertainty about a company’s ability to meet its obligations because earnings have weakened or losses have appeared. The cost of financial distress is what that uncertainty costs, even before a bankruptcy filing.
- Direct costs Use it cash spent on bankruptcy
- Legal and administrative fees paid out in bankruptcy
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- Indirect costs Use it harder to see, often larger
- Lost customers, suppliers, staff even before filing
- Forgone opportunities and reputational damage
- Agency costs of debt managers and lenders in conflict
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- Direct costs are cash spent in bankruptcy: legal and administrative fees.
- Indirect costs are harder to see and often larger: customers, suppliers and employees leave; investment opportunities are lost; reputation suffers; and managers and lenders come into conflict (the agency costs of debt).
These costs are lower when assets have a ready secondary market (airlines and shipping companies can sell aircraft and vessels) and higher for technology, pharmaceutical and service firms with mostly intangible assets. The probability of distress rises with more debt, higher sales risk, higher operating leverage and lower liquidity. Bring them into the model and the tax shield stops being free, which leads to the optimal capital structure in the next lesson.
Exam tip Without taxes: leverage reshuffles risk and WACC stays put. With taxes: the tax shield tD adds value and WACC falls.
Memorize this
MemorizeThe four MM results
| Proposition I (value) | Proposition II (cost of equity) | WACC | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No taxes | constant at | ||
| With taxes | falls as debt rises |
Memory hook The only difference between the two cost-of-equity formulas is the (1 − t). Set t = 0 and they match.
Know it cold Taken literally, taxes without distress costs make 100% debt optimal. Cash flows, not financing, drive most of value.
MemorizeThe five MM assumptions
| Assumption | Means |
|---|---|
| Homogeneous expectations | investors agree on cash flows |
| Perfect capital markets | no taxes, transaction or bankruptcy costs; same information for all |
| Risk-free borrowing and lending | investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate |
| No agency costs | managers maximize shareholder wealth |
| Independent decisions | financing and investment decisions are separate |
Memory hook Everyone agrees, markets are perfect, money is risk-free, managers are loyal, and financing never changes the project.
Know it cold MM do not assume bankruptcy away. They assume it costs nothing.
MemorizeDistress costs are lower or higher for
| Lower | Higher |
|---|---|
| assets with a ready secondary market (aircraft, ships) | intangible-heavy firms (technology, pharma, services) |
| less debt, stable sales, low operating leverage | more debt, volatile sales, high operating leverage |
Memory hook If the assets sell easily, a failure costs little.
Know it cold The probability of distress rises with debt, sales risk, operating leverage and lower liquidity.
- No taxes Memorize perfect markets
- Proposition I V_L = V_U
- Proposition II r_e rises linearly; WACC constant
-
- Corporate taxes Memorize interest is deductible
- Proposition I V_L = V_U + tD
- Proposition II r_e rises more slowly; WACC falls
-
- Taxes plus distress costs Use it an optimal level of debt appears
- Direct costs legal and administrative
- Indirect costs lost customers, staff and chances
-
- Direct costs Use it cash spent on bankruptcy
- Legal and administrative fees paid out in bankruptcy
-
- Indirect costs Use it harder to see, often larger
- Lost customers, suppliers, staff even before filing
- Forgone opportunities and reputational damage
- Agency costs of debt managers and lenders in conflict
-
Quick example
An all-equity firm worth 800 issues debt of 300 and buys back shares. With no taxes, the levered firm is still worth 800.
Quick example
Unlevered cost of capital 12%, cost of debt 6%, D/E = 0.5. r_e = 12% + (12% − 6%) × 0.5 = 15%. WACC stays at 12%.
- 12−6×0.5+12= 15
- 12ENTER6−0.5×12+ 15
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Quick example
Unlevered value 900, permanent debt 250, tax rate 30%. V_L = 900 + 0.30 × 250 = 975.
- 0.3×250+900= 975
- 0.3ENTER250×900+ 975
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Quick example
r_0 = 12%, r_d = 6%, t = 30%, D/E = 0.5. r_e = 12% + 6% × 0.70 × 0.5 = 14.1%. WACC falls as D/E rises.
- 12−6×0.7×0.5+12= 14.1
- 12ENTER6−0.7×0.5×12+ 14.1
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
How it is asked
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Cost of equity, no taxes
r_0 = 13%, r_d = 7%, D/E = 0.7. Cost of equity?
13 + 6 × 0.7 = 17.2%. Traps: 15.9% (a 30% tax applied), 15.5% (D/V instead of D/E).
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Levered value with taxes
V_U = 1,500, D = 500, t = 25%. V_L?
1,500 + 0.25 × 500 = 1,625. Traps: 1,500 (no taxes), 2,000 (whole debt added).
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Which proposition?
The cost of equity rises exactly enough to offset cheaper debt. Which statement?
Proposition II without taxes (WACC is unchanged).
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Value-maximizing mix
With corporate taxes and no distress costs, the optimal structure is?
Close to 100% debt. With distress costs there is an interior optimum.
Exam traps
- Saying WACC falls with leverage under MM without taxes. It stays constant: the higher cost of equity exactly offsets cheaper debt.
- Leaving out (1 − t) in the with-tax cost of equity formula, or using D/V instead of D/E.
- Concluding from MM that capital structure is the main value driver. In MM, cash flows drive value.
- Adding the whole debt amount (not tD) to unlevered value in the with-tax formula.
Checkpoint
7 exam-style questions. About 90 seconds each.
1A company's unlevered cost of capital is 11%, its cost of debt is 6% and its debt-to-equity ratio is 0.6. With no taxes, its cost of equity is closest to:
2Under MM with corporate taxes and no costs of financial distress, the value-maximizing capital structure is:
3An unlevered company is worth GBP 1,200 million. It issues GBP 400 million of permanent debt, and the tax rate is 21%. Under MM with taxes, the levered company's value is closest to:
4A company has an unlevered cost of capital of 10%, a cost of debt of 6%, a tax rate of 25% and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.8. Under MM with taxes, its cost of equity is closest to:
5Under MM Proposition II with no taxes, as a company raises its debt-to-equity ratio, its WACC will:
6Other things equal, the costs of financial distress are least likely to be high for a:
7Which statement is most consistent with the Modigliani–Miller framework?
Key takeaways
- No taxes: V_L = V_U; r_e = r_0 + (r_0 − r_d) D/E; WACC is constant.
- With taxes: V_L = V_U + tD; r_e = r_0 + (r_0 − r_d)(1 − t) D/E; WACC falls as debt rises.
- Costs of financial distress limit how much debt makes sense.
- Cash flows, not the financing mix, drive most of a company's value.
Quick example
An all-equity firm worth 800 issues debt of 300 and buys back shares. With no taxes, the levered firm is still worth 800.
Quick example
Unlevered cost of capital 12%, cost of debt 6%, D/E = 0.5. r_e = 12% + (12% − 6%) × 0.5 = 15%. WACC stays at 12%.
- 12−6×0.5+12= 15
- 12ENTER6−0.5×12+ 15
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Quick example
Unlevered value 900, permanent debt 250, tax rate 30%. V_L = 900 + 0.30 × 250 = 975.
- 0.3×250+900= 975
- 0.3ENTER250×900+ 975
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Quick example
r_0 = 12%, r_d = 6%, t = 30%, D/E = 0.5. r_e = 12% + 6% × 0.70 × 0.5 = 14.1%. WACC falls as D/E rises.
- 12−6×0.7×0.5+12= 14.1
- 12ENTER6−0.7×0.5×12+ 14.1
ENTER enter (on the HP, puts the number on the stack)
Questions about this lesson?
Where this comes back
- Optimal and target capital structure, pecking order and agency costs Capital Structure
- Equity Valuation: Concepts and Basic Tools Equity Investments
- Credit Analysis for Corporate Issuers Fixed Income
Questions candidates ask
What are the Modigliani–Miller propositions?
Proposition I says firm value does not depend on the debt-equity mix when markets are perfect and there are no taxes: V_L = V_U. Proposition II says the cost of equity rises linearly with debt-to-equity, exactly offsetting cheaper debt, so WACC is constant. Each has a version with corporate taxes.
How do taxes change the MM conclusions?
Interest is tax deductible, so debt creates a tax shield worth tD. Firm value becomes V_L = V_U + tD, the cost of equity rises more slowly (the (1 − t) term), and WACC falls as debt rises. Without distress costs, the logical extreme is almost 100% debt.
What are the costs of financial distress?
Direct costs are cash expenses such as legal and administrative fees in bankruptcy. Indirect costs include lost customers, suppliers and staff, forgone opportunities, reputational damage and conflicts between managers and lenders. They are lower when assets sell easily, and rise with debt, sales risk and operating leverage.
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